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Abstract 
This Article is part of an MA thesis: “Iran Wilayat al Faqih System of Governance and Public 
Policymaking” which tried to investigate the challenges that public policy in Iran is facing under 
Wilayat al Faqih system of governance. The article here deals with foreign policy making in Iran from 
Khatami to Ahmadinejad in regards to both Iran regional roleand Iran-U.S. relations. It sheds light on 
the challenges that are facing Iranian foreign policy making which can affect both the regime and the 
ideology of Wilayat al Faqih itself. It also, discusses series of problems that are challenging the 
authority of the supreme leader which resulted in a power struggle between the supreme leader 
(representative of the Wilayat al Faqih institution) and the president (representative of the Republican 
institution) inside the system of governance when it comes to policymaking. The contradictory roles 
between both is a result of the president limited power in formulating foreign policies, together with his 
ideological preferences that is different from the supreme leader. The Article concludes by stating that 
such power struggle between the offices may impact Iran’s domestic policies but not Iranian foreign 
policies, as Iran is becoming a regional power. 
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1. Introduction 
This section will try to question whether or not Iranian foreign policies are crippled by Wilayat al 
Faqih system of governance. There is already a huge consensus between scholars on the impact of 
ideology on foreign policy; however, the limits or the degree of such influence in making foreign 
policy is a contested approach. For analyzing Iranian foreign policy it is important to know the key that 
unlocks the driving force of Iranian foreign policy, which is the ideology of Wilayat al Faqih. How 
Khomeini’s ideology of Wilayat al Faqih is influencing foreign policy.  
Ideology according to Hunt in his well-known work on ideology and foreign policy is “an interrelated 
set of convictions or assumptions that reduces the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily 
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comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that reality” Ideology has to do 
with ideas and beliefs, thus it is important to question the interrelated relationships between ideas and 
policies, and how such ideas shape the world, more specifically, foreign policies. Also, whether 
Khomeini’s ideology (ideas) shape reality or reality is shaping Khomeini’s ideology. An “idea” which 
is a mentalistic connotation can serve as an instrument in policy making. In other words ideology is not 
only influencing policy making, but can be one of the tools in making foreign policy. It can be noted 
that while ideologies reflects power relationships, policy instruments are supposed to facilitates such 
reflection. For example, 
U.S. policy is focused on an ideology of propping up client state governments by training their 
militaries and hunting down their enemies. So, policy instruments are organizations capable of carrying 
out specific activity sequences, therefore, policy instruments, in effect, are  crystallized ideologies. 
Whatever may be going inside people’s heads, in the domain of  foreign policy making, ideology 
takes an organizational form.  
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, “ideology has a religious character which both reinforces its mythical 
dimension and exempts decision-makers from presenting rational justification. It is the will of Allah 
and it is what Islam wants are often used as justification”. Moreover, emphasizing the word of Islam 
more than the word of Iran, does not necessarily obscure national interest, and here comes the question 
of which one is in the service of the other. Is “Islam” the motivator of Iranian foreign policy or Iranian 
“national interest”?  
While it is important to understand ideology in Iranian foreign policy, it does not necessarily mean that 
it will produce a straightforward understanding or clear pattern in grasping Iranian foreign policies, 
because of the role of interest. Therefore, “an understanding of a nation’s ideology provides no certain 
insights into its behavior. Ideologies are important because they constitute the framework in which 
policymakers deal with specific issues...he relationship between ideas and action is not rigid”. The 
factor of interest is important as whether it goes together with the state ideology when shaping reality, 
or it is only that one prevails over the other. However, referring to Max Weber, Goldstein and Keohane 
insist that they do not argue that ideas rather than interests (as interpreted by human beings) move the 
world. Instead, they suggest that ideas as well as interests have causal weight in explanations of human 
action. By applying the Weberian position to the context of foreign policy, Carlsnaes also arrives at the 
conclusion that, the ideological nature of foreign policy is often contrasted with the notion of 
interest…but...these are not mutually exclusive but have, on the contrary, coexisted over the years, 
albeit with a tendency for agencies of interests to contain the agencies of ideology.  
Wilayat al Faqih is the absolute guardianship of the jurist on behalf of Imam Mahdi, such leadership 
attributes resembles that of the Prophets according to Twelver Shi’i beliefs. Khomeini’s revolution 
prepared the way for such revolutionary ideology, in which it has both internal and external dimensions. 
The internal dimension has been discussed in the previous chapters of the research. The external 
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dimension is the worldview of Khomeini’s ideology regarding Iran’s position and relationship with the 
international system, which is written in the Iranian constitution as the discourse of the regime. 
Furthermore, Khomeini’s religious ideology stressed the importance of freedom and independence of 
not only the Iranian nation but also the Muslim nations from the shackles of imperialism. Khomeini, 
out of his ideology, molded the way that the Iranian state will adopt its foreign policies, a global 
Mahdist identity, in which it advocatesan Islamic Imperialism against Western imperialism. The 
symbolism of Imam Mahdi is represented in the Iranian foreign policy as the savior of Muslims; the 
Islamic Republic is thus the savior of Muslims as an Islamic Empire. Khomeini “having directly linked 
the project of the Islamic Republic to the will of Imam Mahdi and his broad objectives: following the 
revolution, all the resources, efforts, and programs of the nation are to be directed to the preparation for 
the reappearance of the Imam. Thus the Iranian regime has a global Mahdist identity”.  
Moreover, Iran since the revolution had transformed itself from systematically legitimated status quo 
power to an internationalist Islamic movement. “The Iranian state thus equipped itself with the 
transnational mandate for the export of the revolution (sudur-e enghelab)”. And the meaning for the 
export of the revolution is turning the Muslim world into one Islamic Empire.Therefore the ideology is 
advocating a single world community, ruled by the Supreme Leader.  
Such abstract perception is institutionalized in the Iranian constitution, which states that: “the 
Constitution will strive in concert with other Islamic and popular movements, to prepare the way for 
the formation of a single world community”. There is a sense of mission in delivering such ideology, 
that even the constitution itself defined its role to carry such mission which is: “to realize the 
ideological objectives of the Revolution (Nehzat) and to create conditions conducive to the 
development of man in accordance with the noble and universal values of Islam”. 
With such a religious character that is embedded in the Iranian constitution, Khomeini made an 
idealistic dualism in fighting imperialism, such dualism is based on the dichotomy between the 
oppressor and the oppressed, the mostazafan-mostakbaran dichotomy. Thus, Khomeinielevated the 
Iranian nation-state to the status of a vehicle of divine substance. Inevitably, the Islamic Republic felt 
destined to change what was perceived to be an overbearingly hierarchical world order. The revolution 
aims to bring about the triumph of the mostazafan against the mostakbaran that it provides the 
necessary basis for ensuring the continuation of the Revolution at home and abroad. Illustrated in 
accordance with the Quranic verse This your nation is a single nation, and I am your Lord, so worship 
Me (21-92).  
Khomeini’s theory may serve as a utopian romanticism of challenging the world order. The 
revolutionary state has a revolutionary foreign policy revealed in its aggressive face in the 
hostage-taking at the US embassy in Tehran (4 November 1979), which served as a red line for 
imperialist intervention in the Iranian state. As the Iranian constitution emphasized in Article 152: “The 
foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the rejection of all forms of domination, 
both the exertion of it and submission to it, the preservation of the independence of the country in all 
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respects and its territorial integrity”. Nevertheless, the same Article also emphasized the aspect of 
defending all Muslims. Although Iran rejects the interference of super powers in its affairs, it will, as an 
ambitious powerstrive for interfering in other states as a regional power and defender of Muslims! 
Therefore, Iran had to marry two identities namely Persian nationalism and Shi’i Islam. 
Khominists believe in the justice of the Islamic revolution as a force that will destroy the system of 
world conquerors Zionism, Capitalism, and Communism. NeverthelessKhomeini’s anti-imperialistic 
struggle, “is not a principled struggle; the goal is not to put an end to imperialism as a harmful concept 
and as an erroneous political and economic construct. Rather, the real issue for Islamists is to replace 
Western imperialism with a new Islamic hegemony as a reminiscence of the golden age of Islamic 
world power (“single world community/ommat-e vahed-e jahani”)”. 
Such struggle against imperialism is a struggle over identity. For example, when taking a look at the 
contemporary major states’ foreign policies it can be noted that struggle over identity has an influence 
on states’ behavior “from Russia’s struggle in the Post-Cold war era to Germany’s concerns about 
transforming itself into a “normal power”, China’s struggle over its global identity, and India’s concern 
that its great-power, and self-identity has never been recognized by others”. Thus, Iran is trying to be 
part of this identity struggle, and in order to be a sophisticated Empire it has to establish the necessary 
resources, such as interfering or conquering Islamic cities, establishing a nuclear power, which is 
considered to be as a national sovereignty, and finally serve as the savior of Jerusalem, in which Iran 
regards itself as an Islamic actor in the Middle East and the guardian of the Muslim world. As 
Khomeini used to say to Iranians during the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988): “the road to Jeru salem goes 
through Karbala”.  
 
2. Wilayat al Faqih and Foreign Policymaking 
Since the Islamic Republic structure of governance has traditional (religious) and Democratic 
institutions, both institutions play a role in foreign policy and international relations decision-making 
process. The main offices that are responsible for foreign policy in the Islamic Republic of Iran are “the 
supreme leader, the president, the Council of the Guardian, foreign minister, the NSC, and the Majles. 
The decision making process on bills goes from foreign minister, to president, to NSC, and finally to 
the supreme leader, who must sign all bills both on domestic as well as foreign policy issues”. Although 
the president and his office is the main body that is working on foreign policies since 1989, still the 
supreme leader is the person who has the final approval on foreign policies. Thus, the religious 
institutions represented by the Supreme leader also overpower the democratic institutions (president 
office) in Iranian foreign policy making.  
The foreign minister reports directly to the president where policy initiatives are monitored in the 
president’s office. The role of the government is to demand for the Majles approval of all international 
agreements where it can be discussed but at the same time does not control the executive process of 
foreign policy decision-making. Regarding The visions of Iranian foreign policy, there is a rivalry 
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between the political elite (political faction) who adopts different ideologies, or those who may have 
different visions on how Wilayat al Faqih’s foreign policy should be. However, the two main groups of 
Iranian political elite with regard to foreign policy making: first the Conservative faction, those who 
emphasize the identity of the Islamic revolution and Islamic values. They want to have good 
relationships with Islamic countries and against the rapprochement with the U.S. The second group 
represents the Pragmatist and Reformist Factions. They advocate for Iran to have a key role in 
international relations, trade and political ties that safeguard the state interest; therefore it doesn’t mind 
having a good relationship with the U.S.  
While the conservatives are ideologically driven, the Reformists and Pragmatists use a pragmatic 
approach in defining foreign policies. However, both agree on three things, which can be seen as the 
fundamental principles of the regime: independence, equality, and a greater role for Iran in international 
relations. Nonetheless, the main rivalry inside the Iranian system of governance regarding foreign 
policies remains between the president, the supreme leader and the foreign minister. Such rivalry of 
who has more power to shape foreign policies emphasizes the question of duality of power between the 
office of the supreme leader and the office of the president, and its impact on Iran’s foreign policies. 
Scholars emphasized the nature of the system of governance impact on foreign policy decision-making. 
For example, “the main lines of foreign policy in liberal democratic regimes are determined by an 
elected government under the constant and decisive control of parliament together with public opinion. 
In such regimes, important changes in the orientation of foreign policy occur slowly and after intense 
debate and deliberation”. While in autocratic regimes change in foreign policy comes quickly, as the 
leader of an oligarchy determines the foreign policy. For example, “the case in Egypt when President 
Anwar el-Sadat made a dramatic decision in 1971 by changing his country’s strategic alliance with the 
Soviet Union, replacing it with an alliance with the United States of America”. Another example, is the 
Shah’s role in Iranian foreign policy, as his decisions were solely made by him in which the ministerial 
cabinet, and the parliament has no impact in his important decisions, such as oil production, and 
changing allies.  
From the previous examples, scholars show how the nature of the system impacts state foreign policies. 
They emphasized that unlike autocratic and liberal democratic regimes, Iran classified as a totalitarian 
state, will also have an impact on its foreign policies, in which foreign policy is shaped in ideological 
terms. According to Mehadi Mozzafri in his article “Islamist Policy”, the supreme leader has unlimited 
powers that his decisions on foreign policies are established according to ideological justifications. 
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Figure 1. Mozzafri’s Diagram of Iranian Foreign Policymaking 
 
Mozzafri put forward a diagram, (see Figure 1 above), explaining that ideology comes before then 
power structure in formulating Iranian foreign policies. Nevertheless, the importance of the House of 
the Supreme Leader or the supreme leader’s institution comes first as the power behind implementing 
such an ideology, as ideology needs power. 
The importance of the House of the Supreme Leader in forming decision making of Iranian foreign 
policies cannot be over looked, as it constitutes the department of foreign policy of the House of 
Leadership. This institution has a supreme role in foreign policy decision making and works with other 
institutions that work in supporting the ideological goals of the regime. The supreme leader’s institution 
and its supporting institutions working on foreign policies reflect the aspect that ideology and interest is 
embedded in institutions, or in the institutional form. This research suggests in Figure 2 below, how 
Iranian foreign policy is shaped in the Islamic Republic of Iran: 
 
 
Figure 2. How Iranian Foreign Policy Is Shaped 
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Power structure thus is influencing foreign policies, or it can be said that it is the main player in 
formulating Iranian foreign policies. The Supreme leader as the leader of an oligarchy is the one who 
balances between ideology and interest, not the president or even the foreign minister, their role is 
simply to put forward or implement the supreme leader’s final decisions. The House of the supreme 
leader reflects what can be called a centralization of policymaking. As The House of the Supreme 
Leader is an institution, then “there is an interaction between interests and ideology in human choices 
and decisions are inevitable by the very fact alone that a sediment of both has become over long 
periods of time an integral part of the fabric of human institutions or is often unrecognizably reflected 
by them”.  
The Supreme leader does not always balance between ideology and interest as interest overpowers 
ideology, but if he can balance between the aspect of ideology and interest, can he balance the power 
struggle between himself and the president? Mozafari emphasized that change happened in Iranian 
foreign policy when a contradiction arises between ideology and interest of the rulers. But he did not 
emphasize the aspect of structure of power rivalry between the supreme leader office and the president 
office in shaping foreign policies. The different institutions in the Iranian power structure entails that 
each would strive for more auto enormous power, and thus working to deliver autonomous interest 
hence impacting regime foreign policies. 
The president institution’s is weaker than the supreme leader’s institution. With such power inequality, 
there is inside the system of governance a power struggle in respect of making or shaping foreign 
policies. The supreme leader and the president each would like to maintain his agenda on foreign policy. 
The matter of coherence in Iranian foreign policy is an issue feared by Mirdamadi of the Mjles’ 
National Security Committee who declared in 2002 “no consensus existed whatsoever between the 
political groups in power on national security or the position of the country on the international 
chessboard”. So, what would the president do if the supreme leader has no control over foreign policy? 
Or can the president implement his agenda without the force of the supreme leader’s ideology of 
Wilayat al Faqih. Does the president see the ideology clashes with Iran’s national interests, or mostly 
with regime interests? 
Moreover, do power rivalry between president and the supreme leader have an impact on Iranian 
foreign policies, taking in mind that impact can also mean change in Iranian foreign policies? However, 
it is still not easy to figure out the reasons behind such an impact, because it could come from either 
power structure or group interest. Also, it cannot be said that the shaping of Iranian foreign policies is 
constrained between nature of the system (structure of power), or interest.  
Nonetheless, rivalry between the two institutions created paradoxical impact on foreign policies. It can 
be noted that despite the system structure of power together with the force of ideology in shaping 
foreign policies, Iran rises as a regional power. This will be discussed in the coming pages in the case 
of Khatami and Ahmadinejad’s foreign policies specifically, the US-Iran relations and Iran’s regional 
role in the Middle East.  
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3. Khatami’s Foreign Policy 
Khatami’s election was not a new political shift only inside Iran, but also outside Iran. The reform 
movement wanted to shift the conceptual paradigm about The Islamic Republic to look for better 
relations with the world. Furthermore, “the aspirations for an open society at home and integration into 
the international community stem from a combined sense of national pride and a growing 
consciousness of the need to be part of the democratic movement sweeping across the world”. Unlike 
their parents, young Iranians did not witness the American hostage crisis during the revolution and 
Khomeini’s motto: “independence, freedom and Islam”, nor did they witness the CIA engineered 1953 
coup. From this stand Khatami carried out as a reformist what the younger generation aspired for: a 
free (democratic) society and peace abroad, which can be interpreted as Khatami’s world view and 
concept of Iranian foreign policy. 
Khatami notion of dialogue between civilizations stress the fact that it is about self-identity in the 
international relations. The Islamic Republic since, the revolution, is trying to emphasize that Iran is a 
unique nation, which preserves its own Persian nationalism and Islamic religion and that it should be 
recognized by the international society with such identity. Khatami wanted to influence or break the 
spell of Samuel Huntington’s thesis of clash of civilizations, and emphasize that the world order should 
not be seen as the “West versus the rest”. In a globalizing world, Khatami thus used the strategy of 
“dialogue” to be part of the international society, believing, and in the same time, trying to convince the 
international society about his philosophical understanding that the international community should be 
dialogical instead of existing diplomatic channels. 
Khatami’s discourse was a clear message to the international community that serves Iran’s willingness 
to get out of its international isolation. An Iranian university professor stressed that Khatami initiative 
“gave Iran a specific reputation without which no diplomatic effort on its part would have succeeded in 
getting substantial results”. Moreover, “it was in this context that Khatami was given recognition in a 
special resolution by the United Nations General Assembly, declaring 2001 the “Year of Dialogue 
Among Civilizations”. The terms upon which this dialogue won international praise, and contributed to 
softening the Islamic Republic’s image”. 
Khatami’s initiative came because of globalization and the increase connectedness not only in politics 
but also in social, cultural, and economic relations. Iran after the revolution was going through the 
Iraq-Iran war. After the war Rafsanjani became the president and Iran went through the so called 
“reconstruction era”, thus Iran is in need to improve its relationship with other countries to improve 
foreign investment in Iran and thus strengthen the Iranian economy. Moreover, “greater economic 
interconnectedness prompted the Iranian establishment-reformist and conservatives alike-to forge a 
more approachable international image. Pressures emanating from economic globalization compelled 
the establishment to assume a more cooperative posture in order to safeguard the country’s prosperity”. 
Thus, it is quite possible to say that Khatami’s foreign policy use of “dialogue between civilizations” is 
influenced mostly to strengthen the economical need more than the political concerns. 
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4. Khatami and Iran-U.S. Relations 
The dialogue that Khatami wanted to use is not new but different. In the sense that dialogue between 
religions and cultures is since the Iranian revolution 1979, as the Islamic Republic used it in its foreign 
policy for the last 33 years. But “after 1991, dialogue among civilizations became instrumental not only 
to integrate the Islamic Republic into the post-Cold War international context but also to defuse 
Western pressures against the Islamic Republic”. The “dialogue” instrument has become one of the 
pillars of Iranian revolutionary foreign policy, an instrument that been used during Ali Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani presidency then Khatami. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that in the 1990s, the term 
goft-o-gu, which means both “dialogue” and “discourse”, was widely used among academic quarterly 
titles published by Iranian intellectuals supporting the reformist movement. It was also the main 
principle of the rhetorical change that characterized the discourse of Iranian public diplomacy during 
the Khatami presidency. However, the supporters of the reformist president acknowledged that the idea 
of dialogue of civilizations was not sufficient to address Iran’s foreign policy concerns. 
Indeed, Khatami “hoped that this conceptual paradigm would lead to a reduction in international 
tensions and a détente with the outside world”. Such instrument could help in strengthening diplomacy 
but not the Iranian intensified issues such as it relations with U.S. and the nuclear issue. Khatami was 
not able to implement his agenda of detent and rapprochement with the West beyond the cultural and 
economic sphere, something that made his instrument of “dialogue” serve just as a rhetoric, therefore 
substance was needed in order to implement a policy of détente. 
Khatami’s “dialogue” helped to change the diplomatic relationships between Iran and Asia and Europe, 
more than their relationship with U.S. Thus, the EU-Iranian relations, blossomed under Khatami and 
frustrated American and Israeli attempts to isolate Tehran. The most significant hurdle to improved 
EU-Iranian relations—Ayatollah Khomeini’s 1989 fatwa against British author Salman Rushdie—was 
resolved in the fall of 1998 through negotiations between Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi and 
his British counterpart, Robin Cook. The triumph of national interest over ideology couldn’t have been 
clearer. 
Khatami did a little in making Iran less isolated in regards to its relationship with U.S. He emphasized 
to the world that Iran is not to be a regional power and it is pursuing nuclear weapon for peaceful 
purposes. Khatami also in his first term hosted the Organization of the Islamic Conference to release 
Iran from its isolation and to reapproach the Muslim and the Arab world. “The summit was followed by 
his famous interview with Christiane Amanpour on CNN (in January 1998), where he called for 
American-Iranian cultural exchanges among scholars, artists, athletes and tourists. He proclaimed 
admiration for American political traditions”. He also emphasized that America’s imperial policies of 
domination toward some countries in the Middle East are against such tradition and great civilization. 
Khatami also blamed Iranian-American hostility on Washington when he stated that: “as long as the US 
is after harming Iran’s interests and independence, Iran will have no relations with the US”. So, on the 
issue of tension between the two states, he said that it is time to “crack the wall of mistrust that had 
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built up between America and Iran”. U.S. was dealing with Khatami in the same way he did which is 
using rhetoric as Clinton made fair statements that Iran has the legitimacy to stand against anyone who 
is interfering in its domestic affairs. For example, the US issued an indirect apology about the CIA coup 
in 1953. Nonetheless, neither diplomacy nor the smiling mullah’s soft rhetoric could lift economic 
sanctions during Clinton administration, and unfortunately, Iran in Khatami’s second term was placed 
by the new Administration of George Bush under the list of “axis of evil”. 
The OIC nevertheless, in regards to Iran’s relations with the Arab states, helped to shutter the long 
decades animosity between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Khatami visited Saudi Arabia to meet with Crown 
Prince Abdullah in which it regarded as the first visit since the revolution. In 2001 “Iran and Saudi 
Arabia signed a historic security pact for combating crime, terrorism, money laundering and 
surveillance of borders and territorial waters”.  
Moreover, Dr. Ghoncheh Tazmini, professor at University of London stated “the methodological hurdle 
that Khatami could not overcome in his attempt to implement his dialogue agenda, namely his inability 
to build a consensus inside the political elite to establish a dialogue with the West”. However, the 
question is not about whether or not to convince the political elite but perhaps about convincing the 
supreme leader! More importantly does the president have the ability in the IRI (Islamic Republic of 
Iran) power structure to shape foreign policy visa-vie the supreme leader’s unlimited powers?  
The struggle between the factional elite was whether to purse ideological justification or national and 
economic interests. It can be seen that although “Khatami chaired the Supreme National Security 
Council (the SNSC, the country’s top foreign policy body), and selected his chosen foreign and defense 
ministers (Kharazi & Shamkhani, respectively), he still had to remain wary of domestic sensibilities”. 
Khatami’s diplomatic relationships was supported by the supreme leader however, he could not 
implement a rigorous foreign policy regarding the rapprochement with the U.S. because of factional 
political elite in the Iranian system was divided on such an important issue. The conservatives 
represented by the supreme leader see that Iranian security should be ahead of any economic 
development, something that the pragmatists and the reformists are pursuing. Moreover, conservatives 
have some sort of mistrust toward the West especially U.S. and Zionism, as the Zionists lobby is 
influencing Washington decision making on Iran. In 2001 “at the end of Khatami’s first term, this 
defensiveness was articulated by the head of the judiciary, Ayatollah Mahmoud Shahroudi, in these 
words: our national interests lie with antagonizing the Great Satan. We condemn any cowardly stance 
toward American and any word on compromise with the Great Satan”. This emphasizes Ghoncheh’s 
point on Khatami’s failure in convincing the political elite when it comes to establishing dialogue with 
the West. 
The supreme leader Khomeini Undermined attempts to establish ties with the U.S. by continuing the 
support of Islamist radical groups in other Muslim countries, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas 
in Gaza/West Bank. Moreover, while Khatami aimed at a dialogue with the U.S., Khamenei considered 
a Dialogue with America even more harmful than establishing ties with the country. As a result, though 
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since 1997 Iranian foreign policy has changed in its orientation and instruments, its substance (Islamic, 
anti-Americanism, anti-Israel, and independence) has remained much the same. 
It can be noted that, “at the theoretical level, it is true that there is a close relationship between power 
and the dynamic of ideas in state behavior. Nevertheless, the case of President Khatami’s 
administration demonstrates that the correlation between discourse in public diplomacy and state action 
is, to say the least, only partially present”. Such disconnection must be noted because of the Iranian 
system of governance, in which the supreme leader is the main player in Iranian foreign policy. 
Does such clash between the institution of the supreme leader and the president institution is impacting 
Iranian foreign policy? The former president Rafsanjani stated in regards to Iran-U.S. tens relationship 
that the relationship is “more of a political notion than a religious mandate, Our ideology is flexible”. 
Rafsanjani depicted the very aspect of Khamenei’s foreign policy, which is a foreign policy that can be 
best described by the 19th century British statesmen Lord Palemerston: “when people ask me for what 
is called apolicy, the only answer is that we mean to do what may seem to be best upon each occasion 
as it arises, making the interests of our country ones’s principle”. Such a method has been inherited in 
Khomeini’s foreign policy. As it can be seen that Khomeini’s decision reaffirmed Iran’s ideological 
goals while ensuring that those goals would not necessarily be actively pursued. The “liberation” of 
Jerusalem would remain a rhetorical vehicle to win legitimacy in the Arab world, but not an ideal to be 
pursued for its own purpose with concrete actions, in order not to jeopardize Iran’s short-term security 
needs. “It reaffirmed that our policy towards the region had a soft-power and hard power side. We 
always declare our views and our beliefs. But that does not mean that we need to operationalize these 
views into actual policy”, argued former Deputy Foreign Minister Vaezi. 
Khomeinism or Khamenei’s foreign policy depends on strategy as an ideology and an ideology as a 
strategy. Ayatollah Khamenei has noted that, “regarding our vital issues, we are not sentimental. We do 
not make decisions based on emotion. We make decisions through calculations”. 
Thus, we can see that the Wilayat al Faqih system of governance did not affect the Iranian foreign 
policies during Khatami’s presidency. Most importantly “the slogan of ‘Death to America’, that came 
with the beginning of the Iranian revolution did not prevent in some stages from rapprochement or 
collaboration if ‘interests’ assumes that without having such attempts be in a formal political situation 
or under the direct orders of the supreme leader”. 
After the 9/11 attacks, Iranian factional elite started again to debate the issue of preserving the Iranian 
national interest based on whether or not to establish relationships with the U.S. Such a debatable issue 
intensified between the political elite after the U.S. preparations for waging a war on Afghanistan, in 
which Taliban posed a significant threat to the Iranian state. In this context, Khamenei’s foreign policy 
offered assistance to the U.S. in such war. Thus, Iran successfully helped U.S. to overthrow Taliban as 
“Iran had considerable influence with the Northern Alliance, the insurgency that had been battling the 
Taliban since the mid-1990s. Tehran used this influence to help the United States secure agreement 
among all elements of the Afghan opposition on a new government that took office in Kabul in 
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December of 2001, only a few weeks after the Taliban’s ouster”. 
This is the kind of “dialogue” that Khamenei wanted to establish not Khatami. The fruits of 
Khamenei’s dialogue with the U.S. can be seen also in U.S. intervention of Iraq to overthrow Saddam 
regime, something that made Iran offer assistance to the U.S. insurgency, but failed to have any 
response, however, after the overthrow of the regime, Iran offered the U.S. assistance because of the 
Iraqi sectarian divide.  
 
5. Khatami & Iran’s Regional Role in the Middle East  
Khatami as a reformist did not transform Iran’ s relationship with the Arab states much, as his policies 
toward the Arabian Gulf were more or less a continuation of Rafsanjani’s policies. Rafsanjani was 
following a policy of detent as a strategy to sustain Iran’s economic developments and national 
interests after the Iraq-Iran war. Thus it can be seen that regarding regional peace and security, 
President Khatami in his address to the eighth summit of the OIC in Tehran in 1997 said that “the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, considers the establishment of regional security and cooperation with the 
participation of all the States in the Persian Gulf. Also, the adoption of reliable measures that would 
bear fruit of lasting security in the region and towards the creation of a common defense of shared 
interests and concerns of all countries and nations”. Moreover, Khatami’s policy of detent in the region 
and especially toward the Arabian Gulf was working as a policy of normalization. Furthermore, Iran’s 
Deputy Foreign Minister in Asia-Pacific Affairs, Mohsen Aminzadeh, stated that “the detente policy 
and reliance-building guidelines as well as developing regional and international peace and stability in 
line with Iran’s political and economic development are the main foundations of Iran’s foreign policy”. 
In regards, to such policy of normalization with countries in the region, the Supreme leader and his 
conservative camp were supporting such a policy, but they would refuse any normalization policies 
with the U.S. and Israel. Khamenei’s support of normalization with the countries in the region such as 
the Arabian Gulf wouldn’t hurt the most important thing in Iran’s foreign policy, which is Wilayat al 
Faqih’s ideology. 
Khatami was assuring the Arabian Gulf that Iran has no intention of taking power in the Arabian 
Gulf.For example Khatami was the first Iranian president to visit Arab counties in the last twenty years. 
In the 1999 he visited number of Arab countries such as Syria, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. His diplomatic 
relations and visits to Arab countries demonstrates that Iran mean no harm for Arab states, which 
helped in having improved relationships between Iran and Arab states. Such improved relationships are 
a result of Iran’s ideological abandonment of the export of the revolution. During such time Iran Iran’s 
relations with Saudi Arabia have improved. However, for relationships between Iran and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) on the issue of the Islands was complex and still unresolved. 
It can be said that Khatami’s policy of normalization with the full support of the supreme Leader 
toward the Arabian Gulf made a calm relationships between Iran and the Arab states. However, Iran’s 
shi’i ideology in the region is something that always haunts Arab’s stability and security. For example, 
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Saudi Arabia is still a potential rival for Iran and rapprochement with it may demonstrate that regional 
leaders are interested in going over negotiations and other possible peaceful means in order to solve 
their interstate conflicts. Still, both parties are skeptical as the ideology of Iran-Arab relations is playing 
a dominant role for centuries, and appeared clearly for the Arab world after the Islamic Revolution of 
1979. 
Indeed Iran’s shi’i ideology is the main reason for deepening the conflict between Iran and Arab states, 
taking the latter as a representative of Sunni states. As it can be seen the “dramatic transformation in 
Iran’s regional environment occurred in the context of the fall of Baghdad in March-April 2003. 
Thanks to the USA’s military intervention, Iran’s most immediate geopolitical and ideological 
challenger, in the shape of Saddam’s regime in Iraq, was obliterated in one fell swoop”. Such regime 
fall strengthened the Shia who was dependent on Iran for survival. The influence of Iran in the region 
became greater when Iraq became Shia dominated state that seeks the economic, social and military 
support from Iran. 
 
6. Ahmadinejad’s Foreign Policy 
Ahmadinejad’s rise to power meant the rise of the neoconservative faction. However, it will be further 
discussed whether or not Ahmadinejad serves as neoconservative or what can be called 
Ahmadinejadism phenomenon. 
Did Ahmadinejad make a shift in Iranian foreign policy after Khatami in regards to the Iran-U.S. 
relations.What kind of challenges did Ahmadinejad face in foreign policy making? Did he receive 
much support from the supreme leader? Since, the supreme leader’s support means institutional support 
thereby legitimacy to practice or deliver actions. The research will further demonstrates whether 
Ahmadinejad’s presidential power of policy making in relation to the supreme leader’s power serves as 
the climax in the history of Iranian presidency under Wilayat al Faqih system of governance. 
For example, in figure 3 and 4 below, the research is suggesting that the circle represents Iranian 
foreign policy. According to Amir Yousefi, professor at Shahid Beheshti University of Iran, “Iran’s 
foreign policy has been confrontational-assertive and accommodationist-active simultaneously”. Thus 
the research used the circle to represent that in figure 3. Moreover as shown in figure 4. Iranian 
presidents of the Islamic Republic were following each other policies but with a slightly different 
tactics with the stick representing Khamenei’s foreign policy, as the supreme leader is the one who is 
responsible for steering Iranian foreign policy.  
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Figure 3. The Circle of Iran’s Foreign Policy Moving between or within Two Points (Actions) 
 
 
Figure 4. The Supreme Leader Steering the Circle of Iran’s Foreign Policy 
 
The most important things for the Iranian people are economy and foreign policy, thus, the new 
president Rouhani said when stepping in office that he wants to change his predecessor’s bombastic 
foreign policy saying that:“his government will adjust its tactics to reach out to world powers”. But he 
said the Islamic Republic would retain its principles. Rohani also, said during the inauguration of Iran’s 
new foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif. “Foreign policy is not where one can speak or take a 
position without paying attention”. Rouhani made some important notions in his speech, namely that he 
will use tactics in his foreign policy (these where the president tasks lie) but that the “Islamic Republic 
will retain to its principles”. In other words, the president has the power to use tactics but not without 
the power of the supreme leader authority, the guardian of how should Iran’s foreign policy work. 
Rouhani further states that “we do not have the right to use foreign policy to chant slogans or clap”, 
which what Ahmadinejad’s did during his presidency in which he tried to shift the Islamic Republic 
identity from an Islamic empire to a nationalist (Persian) Empire, that is against Khamenei (Wilayat al 
Faqih’s foreign policy). Why would it be dangerous if the president shifted Iran’s foreign policy? Is it 
going to hurt the regime or Iran’s national interest? As it can be seen that in the Iranian system of 
governance, the president has room for maneuvering when making a domestic policies, but does he 
have such room when making foreign policies? 
Moreover, Rouhani speaking of change in Iranian foreign policy raises the question of who can change 
Iran’s foreign policy the president or the supreme leader? Or is it the kind of change that the supreme 
leader wants to implement on Iran’s foreign policy whenever a new president came to power? For 
example, can Ahmadinejad adopt a different ideology or tactics in making Iran’s foreign policy, or 
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would he be doomed to fail as Khatami’s tactic of “Civilization dialogue” doomed to fail. Finally, when 
listening to Ahmadinejad’s international speeches, is the president trying to deliver his own voice (view 
on Iranian foreign policy) or the supreme leader’s voice? 
 
7. Ahmadinejad and Iran-U.S. Relations 
While Khatami used “dialogue between civilizations” as a tactic in his foreign policy making, 
Ahmadinejad the populist used “Mahdism or Mahdist rhetoric” as a tactic. Ahmadinejad used such 
tactic to confront both the international system and Wilayat al Faqih system of governance. In addition 
Ahmadinejad’s Mahdist rhetoric is based on a political/sectarian doctrine in which it emphasize the role 
of Wilayat al Faqih doctrine on the Islamic Republic. Ahmadinejad took support from the literature of 
the revolution and the writings of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Khomeini, and his successor 
Khamenei. 
Therefore it can be noted that “Ahmadinejad’s second mandate has seen more focus on this rhetoric in 
his speeches and statements; unlike previous presidents, Ahmadinejad insisted on opening all his 
speeches and official talks with the prayer for a hastening of the reappearance of the occult Imam”. 
Moreover, Ahmadinejad tried to establish a linkage of such rhetoric with the claim of having a 
successful government administration. First he stated that the reason for his victory in the 2009 
controversial elections is because of Imam Mahdi blessings on him. Also, that the success of his 
government’s programs is because of Imam Mahdi, and his victory in his international speeches 
regarding facing the Western control over Iran and the nuclear issue were because of the blessings of 
Imam Mahdi. 
Ahmadinejad in 2005, stated once that while he was delivering a speech to the UN General Assembly, 
he was “encased in an aura of light for the duration of his address. This version of the event engendered 
a wave of criticism in Iran after it spread across the Internet. At the time, some observers regarded 
Ahmadinejad’s words as an indicator of the vision that would guide his actions during his presidency”. 
Furthermore, “Ahmadinejad and his team believed that they should pave the way for emerging Mahdi 
(the Shiite religious hero who will come back in Apocalypse) and establish a Utopia in Iran and the 
world (Chatham House, 2006). On this basis, they seek justice and fair international system and try to 
change the status quo”. Moreover, Ahmadinejad since he came to office emphasized Iranian 
revolutionary foreign policy. As the international community’s particular way of treating the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, especially the West’s way of dealing with president Khatami, has reinforced 
Ahmadinejad’s assertive foreign policy. In spite of domestic developments in Iran and the Khatami 
Administration inclination towards improvement of relations with the outside world, particularly the 
Western countries and adopting a moderate foreign policy based on détente and peaceful coexistence, 
Iran was placed in the “axis of evil”. In the nuclear issue, Khatami Administration adopted a moderate 
stance and suspended enrichment but the Western countries did not reciprocate in at least giving Iran 
security guarantees. 
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Thus, the way that Ahmadinejad bombarded speeches serves as a backlash against U.S. and its allies. In 
one of his UN speeches Ahmadinejad emphasized that the U.S. as an imperialist power deemed to be 
unfit for world governance. Ahmadinejad’s bombastic speeches made diplomatic delegations leave the 
UN, first to leave was U.S. delegation, it was when Ahmadinejad to referred to the September 11 
attacks as an inside job and a pretext to invade Iraq and Afghanistan, and that US and its allies started 
targeting Iran. Ahmadinejad stressed that Iran is under sanctions over its nuclear programme, as a result 
of challenging orthodoxy. He said “by using their imperialistic media network which is under the 
influence of colonialism, they threaten anyone who questions the Holocaust and the September 11 
event with sanctions and military actions”. This is how Ahmadinejad’s dealt with U.S. and its allies in 
his speeches, emphasizing his position against U.S. 
However, although Ahmadinejad showed his support to the revolutionary character and goals of 
Khomeini against imperialism and Israel, he was at the same time eager to have dialogue with the U.S. 
Ahmadinejad sent in 2006 a letter to U.S. former president George Bush (as if it is part of diplomatic 
relations) however, there was no reply back from the U.S. to such a letter. Unfortunately, conservatives 
and reformists accused Ahmadinejad for pushing himself towards America more than it is should be. 
According to such accusation, it is worth questioning of whether or not Ahmadinejad speeches against 
the great Satan were just rhetoric! It can be said though that Ahmadinejad combined between the 
rhetoric against U.S. and the rush toward having a dialogue with it, but why? According to Hooshang 
AmirAhmadi, president of the Association for Relations between Iran and U.S., known as the 
Godfather of relations between the two countries, talked about Ahmadinejad’s hidden love to the 
United States , says that Ahmadinejad tendency toward America is “ a combination of love and hate, 
but he is facingthe pressure from traditional fundamentalists influence in Iran and finds himself forced 
each time to show his hatred without being able to show his love. On the issue of Ahmadinejad 
negotiation with the U.S., Amir Ahmadi stated that Ahmadinejad is found to have a rhetoric with two 
faces, that he cannot hide the desire for open negotiations with the U.S. but at the same time he knows 
the sensitivity of such attempt inside Iran so in order to make things easier for him he substituted the 
word “call for dialogue” for “call for debate”; a framework that made dramatically controversial 
headlines. Furthermore Amir Ahmadi “compares between Ahmadinejad and Khatami regarding 
relations with Washington and says that: Khatami said to Americans: You are good but I cannot talk to 
you, while Ahmadinejad said to them: You are bad, but I want to negotiate with you”. 
The most important issue in Ahmadinejad’s presidency is the nuclear issue, which serves as a huge 
challenge in his foreign policy making agenda. However, it is important to note that with such 
challenge, the nuclear issue is totally at the hands of Khamenei. Furthermore, “in 2003, Iran, under 
President Muhammad Khatami, with Rouhani as his chief nuclear negotiator, had voluntarily 
suspended its enrichment programme for two years and allowed intrusive inspections by the UN’s 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to allay US and European fears about its nuclear 
programme. However, because the U.S. president then was George W. Bush who acted according to the 
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neo-conservatives agendas and principles together with the Zionist lobbies in the U.S., he ignored such 
gesture and ratcheted up sanction. Ahmadinejad when he came to office made a backlash against the 
Bush’s action and he “escalated uranium enrichment and increased the installation of centrifuges from 
164 in 2003 to 19,000 in 2013”. Ahmadinejad knew that the West did not want Iran to complete its 
nuclear activities even within the framework of NPT, thus the foreign policy during Ahmadinejad was 
more of confrontational foreign policy toward the West, and in which is in line with the Supreme 
leader’s foreign policy. Ahmadinejad’s advisor and Mohammadi, former deputy of Mottaki, say that 
from Ahmadinejad’s point of view, “Khatami’s foreign policy did not enjoy enough power as well as 
resolve in order to prevent foreign states’ intervention, particularly regarding the nuclear policies. 
Therefore, the Ahmadinejad Administration tried to avoid passiveness by adopting a confrontational 
foreign policy”. Nevertheless, it is not yet clear enough whether if it was Khatami’s foreign policy in 
dealing with the West was a mistake or if it is actually Khamenei’s mistake! Who should be blamed for 
Iranian foreign policy making? Who should take the responsibilities for delivering such policies, the 
impact of implementing it (noting that foreign policy is related to domestic politics), the supreme leader 
or the president? These are important questions. 
For example, the impact of Ahmadinejad’s nuclear policy is disastrous on Iran’s economic, and social 
well-being. Again is it possible for the president (Ahmadinejad) not to implement the nuclear policy 
that the Supreme leader is controlling? It is hard not to mention how much Ahmadinejad is influential 
in Iran but in regards to taking decisions without the supreme leader’s approval, especially on foreign 
policy is not possible. Therefore, the strength of the president’s abilities to make and influence 
policymaking in Iran is worth questioning as a strong president who represents the will of the people 
and the state interests could easily maintain and have greater authority. Thus “it could be hard for any 
Supreme Guide, to veto a packageof popular reforms presented by a strong president. The presidency is 
a bully pulpit that, if used effectively, could mobilize public support for policies that the revolutionary 
organs might regard as not radical enough or even counter revolutionary”. 
In order to gain support for the president, Ahmadinejad tried to view that the economic problems that 
Iran is going through is not because of him (as he is not the person who holds the nuclear issue). 
Although economic problems existed before Ahmadinejad, however, the U.S.-led sanctions made 
things worse even for Ahmadinejad’s populist economic plans. “The combined effects of draconian 
Western sanctions, corruption and sheer mismanagement are hitting the economy badly. High inflation 
and rising unemployment are adversely affecting working people and the salaried middle class. Food 
prices are rising from one day to the next, and many are being pushed further into poverty”. 
Furthermore, on the issue of currency crisis, economists agree that it has been triggered by the financial 
sanctions which on top of a huge reduction in oil revenues from the EU, made it harder for Iran to carry 
on injecting petrodollars into markets to keep exchange rates down. What is making it worse is that the 
country is plagued by a power struggle between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, said one Iranian analyst, 
so instead of handling the crisis the president is preoccupied by the arrest of his press advisor and the 
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central bank seems completely undecided and shifts from one policy to another. 
Criticizing the government policies is a losing game in Iran, more importantly, critiques of the Iranian 
nuclear programme, a project under the auspices of Khamenei’s office, will most likely not be heard. 
The impact of economic sanctions is something that Ahmadinejad blamed for and “although all foreign 
and defense policies are determined by the Supreme Leader, members of Khamenei’s inner circle allege 
that Ahmadinejad’s nuclear policies are the cause of UN, U.S. and European Union sanctions that have 
harshly impacted Iranian oil exports and banks”. However, after all this, what the system was trying to 
do in that it was convincing the people that it is mainly Ahmadinejad’s responsibilities. 
Media in Iran also had a role in making the president responsible for the economic crisis that the 
Iranian people are facing. For example, an article published Wednesday, Oct. 3, by the Baztab 
website—a media outlet with ties to Mohsen Rezai, the former commander of the IRGC in which it 
tried to accuse Ahmadinejad’s nuclear policies for “intervening in nuclear negotiations by replacing 
then-chief negotiator Ali Larijani with Saeed Jalili. Baztab claimed that Larijani had reached a 
consensus draft in 2008 with Javier Solana, then the-chief foreign-affairs official of the EU, which was 
approved by Khamenei. However, Ahmadinejad publicly refuted the draft and removed Larijani from 
his post”. Thus, the article served as a pretext to absolve Khamenei of the consequences of the 
country’s nuclear policies in which Ahmadinejad has no control of it. 
Nonetheless, during Ahmadinejad last visit to the UN he tried to give several suggestions over the 
nuclear negations, a move that evoked the hardliner Hossein Shariatmadariwhose the editor-in-chief of 
Keyhannewspaper-which served as the supreme leader mouthpiece. The editor tried to remind the 
president of his limited powers, stating that the president should not go against the legal authority of the 
Supreme leader regarding changing nuclear policies. He then supported his article at the end with 
Khamenei’s reasons of why Iran should not go for negotiations with the U.S. Ahmadinejad tried to rid 
himself of the blame that was put on him and to throw it over Khamenei and his system of governance. 
He stated in his press conference, that “state television and other media criticize him and his cabinet, 
while awarding the judiciary and parliament a free pass, because I am the only person who is 
accountable before the people”. For Khamenei blaming Ahmadinejad a thing that has many reasons: he 
wanted to show Ahmadinejad that the presidency has no independent power under his regime, as it 
served as a threat to the mullah regime. He also wanted to make Ahmadinejada scapegoat if he wishes 
to initiate a new round of nuclear negotiations following the US presidential elections. The leader can 
then portray himself as much wiser than Ahmadinejad in order to reassure the West about his rationality 
and willingness to reach a deal. This would make it much easier for him to justify compromising over 
the nuclear dispute to the Iranian people as well. 
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8. Ahmadinejad and Iran’s Regional Role in the Middle East  
The U.S. president may opt to do he will make Iran, perforce, even more powerful than it is. 
Accommodating the Islamic Republic will give it even more From what is previously discussed it is 
noted that: “Ahmadinejad has adopted confrontational-assertive and accommodationist-active foreign 
policy at the same time”. Ahmadinejad accommodationist active foreign policy was toward the third 
world, mainly the Muslim world, and his confrontational foreign policy was toward the West. However, 
Ahmadinejad had to adopt such foreign policy, as it is part of the nature of the Wilayat al Faqih system 
of governance, which is to adopt the supreme leader’s foreign policy. Thus the president has no choice 
but to abide by Khamenei’s simultaneous use of confrontational-assertive and accommodationist-active 
foreign policy. 
Other than taking care of post-Iraq civil strife, Iranian foreign policy during the turbulent 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency was also focusing on the Arab-Israel conflict together with their role in the 
Arab Spring. This helps to see that Iranian foreign policy does not only trying to manage to overcome 
conflict of power inside the system plus domestic problems, but also trying to manage to hold on the 
interplay of Islamist ideology and nationalistic mandate. 
Iranian nuclear program made Israel and the Arabian Gulf afraid that it would threat the stability of the 
Middle East. Nonetheless, Iran views Israel and the West to be behind the game of projecting Iran as a 
threat if it had a nuclear power. Thus, “the conduct of Iran’s foreign relations represents a picture far 
from the idea of Ahmadinejad leading Iran down a path of isolation and painful retraction. Nor does his 
foreign policy provide evidence of his naivety in designing a strategy or misunderstanding international 
politics”. 
Therefore, Ahmadinejad by accusing Israel of being a threat when he said that: “this Zionist regime 
should be wiped off the map”. He wanted to shift the image of Iran depicted as a threat by the West and 
Israel, and to direct the Muslim world and reminded it of their real enemy that is occupying Jerusalem. 
Ahmadinejad used the tactic of “populism-international” in order to win the alliance of not only the 
Muslim world, as a Muslim state who is responsible for the Palestinian case, but also with the third 
world countries that is anti-American, anti-Western. 
Such populist–international move by Ahmadinejad served as a significant attempt toward mobilizing 
the Muslim world to be stronger internationally and to prevent any US suggestion to build alliances 
with the Muslim world against Iran. Ahmadinejad supported his move as since coming to office he has 
visited seven countries all of them being Muslim-dominated. In addition, “he has held more than 45 
foreign meetings, predominately with representatives from Muslim states that are seen to be rouge, 
anti-American or anti-Western on the international arena (such as Venezuela & Cuba). Also, he has 
communicated with over 52 leaders—mainly in the Muslim world but also with leaders in Latin 
America and Africa”. 
Furthermore, in his foreign policy Ahmadinejad tried to substitute the world of Islam with Persian 
nationalism, something that is against not only Wilayat al Faqih system of governance but also against 
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Iranian (Khamenei’s) foreign policy. Ahmadinejad used the Arab spring in his battle against the regime 
(Khamenei and his supporters), showing that he supports the people’s will, painting in the minds of the 
Iranian people the populist leader. For example, he started to use the slogan of “long live spring” in his 
speeches, and in which some explained as being a hint to the Arab Spring. According to the opening to 
one of the newspaper’s editorial, “this styleof thinking andtalking about (the human awakening) is a 
political maneuverand a dangerous work.” TheAhmadinejad maneuverin its entirety is concerning his 
legacy, these efforts is to keep allof his political powerand his allies, according to experts.  
Nevertheless, the conflicting roles that Iran is playing in the Bahraini and Syrian revolution made Iran 
as (an Islamic state) appear in a complex situation in relation to the Islamic world and the international 
relations. The Syrian revolution exposed that Syria was in a strong alliance with Iran that is not 
restricted to political ties nor a limited time. So in regards to ending the Syrian crackdown it was most 
unexpected that Ahmadinejad supported other world leader’s stand against the crackdown and “called 
for President Assad to end his violent crackdown of an uprising challenging his authoritarian rule in 
Syria”. Ahmadinejad showed to the world that the president is aware of what was happening in Syria 
which was contrary to Khamenei’s statements on Syria, that whatwas happening is not a revolution and 
not part of the Arab spring uprising. 
For example, An article posted in the Reformist newspaper Rooz “Playing with Khamenei in Syria’s 
Field?” stated that during an interview in al-Minar Television, Ahmadinejad took a 180 degrees 
position that is different from of Khamenei’s views on Syria. His views came regarding the issue of 
Iran’s foreign policy and the biggest challenge that it is facing in the Middle East, which is revolution 
against Assad, Iran’s ally. At the interview Ahmadinejad said: “the people and government of Syria had 
to sit together and come to an agreement on reforms. He also said that the Syrian people must have the 
right to elections, freedom and justice, adding that a schedule should be agreed on this and the West not 
be allowed to intervene in its affairs”. Such statements were different from Supreme Leader’s position 
on the issue. According to an informed source who spoke with Rooz, the Supreme Leader’s advisor on 
International affairs called Ahmadinejad a day before the interview and told him to maintain the same 
position of the Supreme leader. However, Ahmadinejad maintained his own views in order to get some 
concession from the supreme leader on Iran’s domestic policies. Is it possible that Ahmadinejad way of 
using his own tools was actually against the supreme leader more than against Assad and his regime? 
In regards to the supreme leader stand on Syria on the other hand Khamenei stated that: The events in 
Syria are fundamentally different in nature from those occurring in the other countries of the Middle 
East. By trying to simulate in Syria the events that occurred in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya, the 
Americans are trying to create problems for Syria, a country that is on the path of resistance. The 
Islamic awakening in the regional countries is anti-Zionist and anti-American in nature. America and 
Israel are clearly involved in the events in Syria. The movement of the people of Bahrain is similar to 
the movement of the people of Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, and there is no sense in distinguishing 
between these similar movements. 
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It can be noted how the international conflict around Syria is developing more like a “sick man” in the 
region. An issue that even if the president of Iran wants to solve by himself, he wouldn’t be able to do 
so because of his limited powers inside the system of governance. Also, because, the Syrian issue lies 
in the hands of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and (until today) the government of President Hassan Rouhani 
does not have a say in it. Although Syria is becoming more and more costly to Iran, especially given 
that there are no short-term prospects of a political resolution to the crisis. Syria remains a crucial 
component in Iran’s policy to becoming the dominating power in the region. 
However, Iran is seeing the “Arab Spring” as a golden opportunity to export Khomeini revolution to 
the Middle East. It also emphasizes the idea that the “Arab Spring” is influenced by the Iranian 
revolution. Like what Ahmadinejad said: “Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions are products of Imam. 
One can witness the hand of Imam in managing it”. Ahmadinejad is relating his messianic beliefs by 
saying that what the world is going through now, (meaning “Arab Spring”) is by Al Mahdi’s work and 
that this will help the world to get rid of the U.S. and Israel. It is also, something that his leader 
(Khamenei) emphasized before him. However, it seems that Al Mahdi does not want to have a Syrian 
revolution in the first place, and that can be seen through Iran’s reactions, especially Khamenei’s 
speeches. 
While for Bahrain, Iranian foreign policy showed that when the Shi’i community in Bahrain were 
persecuted, or when the rights of the Hazara people of Afghanistan were violated, Iran spoke up about 
the rights of the Shia. It is only when Shi’i rights are at stake that Iran adopts the rhetoric of human 
rights and civil freedoms. Whereas when it comes to Syria, it is indifferent to the humanitarian situation. 
Iran has not donated a single penny to support Syrian refugees. 
Also, it can be seen how Iran using Shi’ism as a Trojan horse in Arab states. “Iran has repeatedly 
denied having claims over Bahrain but the tensions have underscored the deep suspicions between 
Sunni-ruled Gulf Arab nations and non-Arab, Shiite Muslim Iran. Gulf Arab states are concerned about 
spreading Iranian influence in Iraq, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip and its potential effect on their own 
Shiite communities”. 
Ali Khamenei made a comment over the Bahraini uprising stating that Iran is not supporting Shi’i 
protestors in Bahrain, and that what is happening in Bahrain has nothing to do with Shi’ism or Sunnism. 
Khamenei’s statement made viewing the situation as being sarcastic, he is giving us one option towards 
such a statement that if it’s not about “sectarianism” as he claimed then it would surely be about Iran. 
Khamenei supported his claim by saying that “Iran has been supporting the Sunni Muslims in Palestine 
over the past 32 years and this shows that Iran makes no difference between Shi’is and Sunnis. 
Khamenei said also that the Saudi military intervention in Bahrain is a mistake and that the Bahraini 
people only demand to have one vote for one leader. Iran’s conflicting roles in Bahraini and Syrian 
revolution reflected its agendas. For Bahrain it used the instrument of mobilizing Shi’is to overthrow 
monarchial system of Bahrain under the guise of freedom and human rights as the principles of 
people’s revolution. And when Syrian people fought for the same principles, the Iranian regime labeled 
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their revolution as a Western conspiracy meant to harm the “Axis of Resistance”. 
Moreover, in the 2013 Islamic Summit, Iran used its own translation regarding the Syrian revolution. 
The translator replaced the word Bahraini instead of the Syrian revolution during Egyptian president 
Morsi speech. Iran’s Persian translation for the situation may work with the Bahraini Shi’i but not with 
Sunni Bahraini nor with the Syrian opposition. 
The regional and international problems that Iran is facing had a role in revealing the discord between 
the supreme leader and the president. The latter used Mahdism to support or give more legitimacy to 
his presidency. Ahmadinejad kept referring to Imam Mahdi in his political speeches as a bullying tool 
against Khamenei. Thus Ahmadinejad is not following fundamentalist nor reformist but 
Ahmadinejadism. Ahmadinejad used Mahdi as tool of power inside the Wilayat al Faqih system and 
outside it. While Khamenei use of Mahdi is only from a divine perspective (that some said that Imam 
Khamenei is in a direct contact with Imam Mahdi) to maintain the aura of divine power surrounding 
Khamenei. On the contrary, Ahmadinejad wanted to wipe off this aura surrounded by Khamenei to 
show the people that he and Khamenei are in the same level, and the president should not be less 
powerful. Ahmadinejad did exploit the people’s belief of Mahdism as much as his master Khamenei did. 
Moreover, he tried to preach nationalism, bringing back Iran role not as an Islamic state but as a Persian 
state, which is the opposite to Khamenei’s ideology of foreign policy. 
Furthermore, it can be noted that the Iranian president cannot really maintain a final decision regarding 
Iran’s power visa via the international system or between states without Khamenei’s power and support, 
as he is facing a problem inside the system of governance itself. Iranian foreign policy making reflects 
not only power struggle between the supreme leader and the president but also the struggle between the 
state and the revolution interests, that public policy making is trapped in such struggle, whether to 
make a policy for the interest of the state or the revolution. 
In short, in Iran there is a political factionalism between the elite on foreign policy making divided into 
two camps: supporters of Khamenei’s foreign policy and supporters of non-Khamenei’s foreign policy, 
the latter is represented by the Iranian president and his supporters. Thus such factionalism is a 
projection of the power struggle between the supreme leader institution and the presidency institution. 
The question is does such power struggle in the system affects foreign policy making? The Wilayat al 
Faqih system of governance impact over foreign policy is paradoxical, the power struggle in the system 
over foreign policy making has an impact inside Iran more than outside Iran. As Khamenei with such 
power struggle in the system is trying to balance the aspect of ideology and interest in foreign policy, 
that is taking care of domestic policies in order not to influence or jeopardize the Wilayat al Faqih 
system of governance. Thus, we can see that part of the nature of Iran’s foreign policy is to preserve the 
regime of Wilayat al Faqih system of governance since its establishment in 1979. This can be noted in 
Khamenei’s Friday Prayer speeches, emphasizing the role of the revolution in establishing such system 
of governance that the superpowers want to remove.  
Although Wilayat al Faqih system of governance foreign policymaking hurt Iranian domestic politics, 
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it made Iran rise as regional power in the Middle East.  
The resourceful clerics in Iran had turned themselves into the key strategic factor in any move that 
Obama may make in the region-and in that in an age of asymmetric warfare, whateverregional power 
and prestige; attacking it will instantly bring out its scarcely hidden nature as basically a guerrilla 
operation and a garrison state. 
For example, Iran role in Iraq as the overthrow of Saddam Hussein was a gift from U.S. to Iran together 
with Iranian support to overthrow the Taliban government all served Iran more than the U.S. Obama 
will have to solicit, one way or another, the active support of the Islamic Republic of Iran—and in 
achieving that end he will have to concede their regional share of power, which might include 
accepting a nuclear dot on an “axis of evil”. Syrian situation today serves as a better example of how 
Iran’s role is significant in solving such a festering sore in the region. Nevertheless, the fundamental 
challenge for IRI’s foreign policy is domestic pressure and preserving the legitimacy of the regime. 
Also, the “fundamental domestic challenge to the very legitimacy of the Islamic Republic puts all its 
regional allies under strategic and logistic pressure”. 
Furthermore, on the issue of Iran’s relationship Arab–Israeli conflict, “a key pillar of Iranian 
revolutionary government’s foreign policy is rhetorical opposition to Israel but practical collaboration 
with the Jewish State”. Nevertheless, the Shah had close ties with Israel made the new clerical regime 
want to fix the Arab-Persian relationships, through using political Islam. So, “that orientation 
intensified Tehran’s need to oppose Israel, even though clandestine security ties with the Jewish state 
continued”. However, Ben-Ami Israeli, a former foreign minister, stated that “Iran was an enemy of the 
peace process, it was not interested in a peace agreement between Israel and the Arab world, probably 
because this could have isolated Iran further”. 
Furthermore, Iran’s supreme leader told the head of Hamas that “the holy war for Palestine is for the 
honor of Islam and Muslims, and we will continue our firm support for the Palestinian people despite 
all the political and economic pressure, and that the issue of Jerusalem was not a Palestinian problem, 
but one for all Muslims”. However, it was easier for Iran to emphasize such rhetoric rather than 
confirming their words into a political action. Such slogans of supporting the intifada were rarely 
followed by concrete actions, even after the outbreak of the second Intifada. Even the Iranian people 
knew how much Iran supported the Intifada, as “a joke in the streets of Tehran reflected Iran’s pretense: 
“why aren’t there any stones left to stone the adulteress? Per the order of the Supreme Leader, all the 
stones have been shipped to Palestine as Iran’s contribution to the Intifada”. 
Collaborating with Israel and the U.S. is something that would put the religious ideology in which the 
regime is based on in jeopardy. The rhetoric of the Supreme leader is constantly being against the state 
actions, as Iranian foreign policy has a nationalistic interest that disguised with Islamist ideology. 
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